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AGENDA ITEM 2 
ADDRESSING THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS AND PROMOTING 
 NATIONAL HEALING AND RECONCILIATION 
 




SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
 
1. This report examines the status of implementation of Agenda Item 2 of the National 
Accord: Addressing the humanitarian crisis and promoting national healing and 
reconciliation. It covers the state of the humanitarian crisis, actions taken to settle 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and the challenges they face, as well as measures 
taken to promote national healing and reconciliation.  
 
2. The report covers the period between March 2008 and January 2009. The data on which 
this report is based was obtained from both primary and secondary sources. Information 
has been derived from reports by different agencies working in the area of humanitarian 
assistance as well as, official sources. This has been complemented by interviews with 
key informants and Focus Group Discussions at the local level with IDPs, government 
officials, civil society and host communities. The survey data reported here is based on 
people’s perceptions about the status of implementation of this agenda point. 
 
Resettlement: Number and Situation of IDPs 
 
3. Different agencies and the Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence 
(CIPEV) estimated the number of Internally Displaced Persons at about 350,000. New 
data now suggests that this figure was grossly understated. In December 2008, the 
Ministry of Special Programmes, in conjunction with the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees and the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, released the 
results of a profiling exercise in the country, which showed that the 2007 post-election 
violence produced 663,921 IDPs.1 This is about double the initial estimates. Given this 
new figure, then assistance by the Government and aid agencies has reached a 
significantly smaller percentage of IDPs. This raises concerns about the actual impact of 
combined efforts on the IDP crisis.    
                                                 
∗ *Supported by a grant from Foundation Open Society Institute (Zug) 
1 Interview with Director, Department of Mitigation and Resettlement at the Ministry of Special Programmes, January 16, 2009. 
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4. Official figures show that 98.6% or 292 out of the 296 initial IDP camps have been 
closed.2 These statistics also show that about 73% of IDPs (or about 255,000 people out 
of the initially estimated 350,000) have returned to their homes since the start of 
Operation Rudi Nyumbani (ORN) in May 2008. Since the number of those assisted is 
likely to be correct because of audit and back-checking procedures, the new figures 
vindicate the sceptics and critics who argue that the humanitarian crisis is poorly 
addressed. The implication of the new figures is that instead of 73% of IDPs having 
returned home, less than 40% have in fact done so. This also implies that the 
humanitarian crisis facing IDPs is far from over. This finding is disturbing given that 
IDPs’ situation is not a priority in national discussions any more. 
 
5. With the closure of most camps, the government is moving away from assistance to IDPs 
in camps to revival of agriculture by helping returnees cultivate their farms, promoting 
peace and reconciliation, trauma counselling, repair of infrastructure, expanding schools 
and other social services in host areas, support to local councils to reconstruct show 
grounds where IDPs lived, and to revival of businesses.3 
 
6. There are conflicting reports on the success of the government’s resettlement programme 
– Operation Rudi Nyumbani. On the one hand, resettlement figures show a steady decline 
in the number of official IDP camps. The figures also show a decline in the number of 
IDPs who have not returned to their homes. On the other hand, findings by civil society 
organisations suggest that the humanitarian crisis is far from over because many IDPs 
have not re-established their homes on their farms but remain in ‘transit camps’ in return 
areas. Closure of official camps is no measure of success in addressing the crisis.  
 
7. Findings by other agencies, as well as our own field survey, show that ‘transit camps’ 
have proliferated in return areas. In August 2008 alone, there were 160 such camps.4 
These are camps in which IDPs settle after moving from official camps. Some settle there 
because of perceived insecurity, lack of resources to re-construct their homes, or while 
waiting to receive ‘start up’ and shelter reconstruction funds from the Government. Other 
IDPs are pooling resources to buy small parcels of land for settlement, not subsistence. 
There are also IDPs in urban areas and those integrated in communities who have not 
found sustainable solutions to their displacement. 
 
8. Human rights organisations have raised concern over alleged use of force, push factors 
and false promises to facilitate movement out of camps. Some argue that forcible closure 
                                                 
2 See progress of closure below; UNOCHA, Humanitarian Update, Vol. 41, Dec 2008, p.6, http://ochaonline.un.org/kenya 
3 Interview with Director, Department of Mitigation and Resettlement, Ministry of Special Programs, Jan 16, 2009 
4 For instance, in August 2008, the Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS), WFP and an interagency assessment concluded that there 
were at least 160 transit sites. See OCHA Humanitarian Update Vol. 34, p.5; In November, KRCS data based on food assistance 
provided through the emergency programme (EMOP) reported 131 transit sites, Humanitarian Update Vol. 41, p. 6.  
 3
of camps was meant to reinstate Kenya’s international image as a peaceful and politically 
stable country that hosts refugees from the region rather than a country generating its own 
IDPs. At the same time, logistical challenges presented by the dispersed transit sites 
hinder delivery of humanitarian assistance. It is apparent that the IDPs’ problem is far 
from settled. Yet, the IDPs’ situation is receding from the national agenda – among the 
political leadership, civil society and the media. Because of this, there is limited pressure 
to keep IDPs as a national issue that require continued Government’s intervention.  
 
9. A failure to address the IDP situation squarely presents not only a current humanitarian 
and human rights concern, but also a risk to future peace and stability. 
 
Access to relief and assistance funds 
 
10. The National Reconciliation and Emergency Social and Economic Recovery Strategy 
estimated that the resettlement of IDPs would cost Ksh31.4 billion. However, only 
Ksh1.96 billion was raised through budgetary allocation and a funds drive by the 
President, donors and individuals. Of this amount, Ksh1.38 billion has been spent on 
resettling 255,000 IDPs, including 91,180 households that have received Ksh10,000 start-
up funds and 18,195 households that received Ksh25,000 shelter reconstruction support. 
 
11. Consistent allegations of corruption have dogged the administration of the relief and 
assistance funds. Complaints include forged lists of beneficiaries, genuine IDPs missing 
from lists, and ‘neglect’ of those not in camps. Some have also raised concerns about the 
programme’s prioritization of IDPs who stay in camps while glossing over IDPs 
integrated in their communities. Others have complained about discrimination of IDPs on 
ethnic basis.  By November 2008, the Resettlement Programme had run out funds.  
 
12. These issues have certainly influenced public opinion on the Government’s performance 
in resettling and assisting IDPs. These issues also suggest that the relief and assistance 
programme has shortcomings that will diminish immediate positive effect within a short 
time. It is significant that the programme is perceived as assisting only in camps and 
returning IDPs. Although it is widely acknowledged that the Kikuyu were the majority 
among the displaced in camps, the perception that assistance is disproportionately 
targeted at one community erodes the condition for healing and reconciliation in return 
areas.  
 
13. These shortcomings have reduced people’s confidence in the assistance programme. 
From our baseline survey, about 55% of the population are not satisfied with the 
Government’s efforts in resettling IDPs. Another 57% are also not satisfied with efforts 





14. The IDPs question cannot be settled – in a sustainable manner – without addressing the 
fundamental factors that occasion displacements during elections. Unless the Government 
fast tracks institutional and constitutional reforms, the problems responsible for IDPs will 
become more complex.  
 




15. The Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV/Waki Commission) 
released its report on October 15, 2008. This report showed that the violence was 
spontaneous in some regions but planned in others. The report noted that the extent to 
which the IDPs problem is or is not addressed will be the barometer by which the 
Government will be judged in addressing the problems and effects of post-election 
violence.5 However, politicians in the Rift Valley Province and some in Central Province 
received the report, initially, with hostility. In the Rift Valley, there were threats to re-
displace returning IDPs if the recommendations of the CIPEV report were implemented.  
 
16. In our view, implementation of CIPEV recommendations must take place in tandem with 
broader social-political reforms. Implementation of other reforms must begin in earnest in 




17. Concerns over the environmental consequences of depleting the Mau Forest led to the 
announcement in June 2008 that up to 15,000 households that had encroached on, or 
illegally acquired land in, Mau Forest Complex would be required to vacate by the 
October 31, 2008. The government warned that forcible evictions would follow. 
However, Rift Valley MPs perceived the planned evictions as discriminatory to the 
Kalenjin community and threatened to pull out of the Orange Democratic Movement 
party. Leaflets circulated in Molo District urging returning IDPs to leave their lands to 
Kalenjin, should evictions in Mau be effected. 
 
18. In September, a group calling itself the ‘Baraget Land Defence Force’ emerged to prevent 
the execution of official evictions and protect ancestral land from ‘outsiders’. In October, 
the Government appointed a Task Force to examine the occupation of Mau Forest with a 
view to finding alternative land, but hostile residents prevented it from carrying out its 
                                                 
5 CIPEV Report, p. 271 
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mandate.6  The residents also threatened to evict returning IDPs should they be asked to 
leave the forest complex.  
 
19. The manner in which politicians have reacted to CIPEV report and Mau Forest issues 
indicates their willingness to mobilise ethnic identity, both at the local and national level 
to undermine reforms if such reforms threaten their immediate interests. Parochial 
considerations, in the name of ethnic groups, are likely to influence the direction of 
reforms – and their implementation – if no adequate mechanisms are in place to insulate 
the reform agenda from political feuds, local and national. 
 
Actions to Promote Healing and Reconciliation  
 
20. In June 2008, the Government mandated District Peace Committees to carry out peace-
building activities in return areas. Since October 2008, however, a shortage of operational 
funds has hindered their work. Some donors have pledged to give support from January 
2009.  
 
21. UNDP, in partnership with the Government, supports the Neighbourhood Volunteer 
Scheme to train District Officers and the youth on peace-building in 19 districts. NGOs 
are also supporting peace-building initiatives. The major challenge has been low 
community participation, focus on IDP camps and the perception among the local ethnic 
community that such meetings are designed to benefit only the returning population who 
are from a different community. As a result, participation of the locals in peace activities 
is low. 
 
22. Parliament passed the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Bill on October 23, 2008. On 
November 28, 2008, the President assented to the Bill, making it law. Civil society 
groups have expressed concern over the Act’s clauses on amnesty and lack of clarity on 
modalities for promoting reconciliation. Our baseline survey findings show that only 12% 
of Kenyans are confident that the TJRC will promote healing and reconciliation. A 
whopping 44% are not confident that it will promote national unity.  
 
23. Laws cannot drive healing and reconciliation; laws only protect conditions that facilitate 
healing and reconciliation. These conditions must be in place and then receive legal 
protection through legislation. These conditions include taking actions that will lead to 
the creation of positive perceptions about commitment to promoting justice, fairness and 
equal access to opportunities. Instituting reforms – in the context of Agenda Item 4 – is 
an urgent matter. 
  
 
                                                 




24. Form IDP camps have closed down but the emergence of transit camps and relocation 
sites indicate that the IDPs problem is far from over. The option by some IDPs to remain 
in closed camps and school compounds clearly shows that the closure of official camps is 
not a good indicator of success in resettlement efforts. It shows that fundamental causes 
of conflict and inter-ethnic mistrust remain unaddressed and continue to hinder the 
achievement of sustainable peace in return areas.  
 
25. Threats against IDPs suggest that the IDPs problem is intertwined with broader national 
social-political problems. The IDPs question cannot be addressed successfully in the 
absence of comprehensive reforms envisaged under Agenda Item 4 of the Kenya National 
Dialogue and Reconciliation Accord. 
  
26. Our findings show that while some groups of IDPs returned voluntarily, in some regions 
the Government used push factors to force IDPs out of official camps. These included the 
disconnection of water supply (Nakuru Show Ground), use of force (Endebess, Kedong’), 
and threats (Burnt Forest). Again, this raises a need to anchor the IDP re-settlement 
efforts on other broader reforms – it cannot be addressed in isolation from other social-
political reforms. 
 
27. Healing and reconciliation is an imperative for sustainable peace in areas affected by the 
Post-Election Violence. Although different agencies are making several efforts to 
promote healing and reconciliation, they appear to have limited impact. Successful 
healing and reconciliation, depends on the commitment of politicians. This commitment 
is in turn dependent on the extent to which the country embarks on institutional and 
constitutional reform. Conditions for fair play, fairness and social justice must be seen to 
be in operation in order to create a reform-supportive culture. 
 
28. Healing and reconciliation is an issue that cannot wait until the TJRC is operationalised 
or until an Integration Commission is established. To promote national cohesion and 
reconciliation, the two principals should form groups comprising political leaders to 






29. Over 1,300 people were killed in the violence that followed the 2007 disputed 
presidential election results in Kenya, and over 500,000 are estimated to have been 
displaced. According to Kenya Red Cross Society and United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Kenya, approximately 301,000 moved into 296 
camps and the rest were absorbed in the community by friends and family.7 In response, 
the UN system, NGOs, Kenya Government and the Kenya Red Cross Society launched 
the Emergency Humanitarian Response Plan. In February 2008, the Government created 
the Department of Mitigation and Resettlement in the Ministry of Special Programmes to 
manage the National Humanitarian Fund for Mitigation of Effects and Resettlement of 
Victims of Post-2007 Election Violence.   
  
30. In May 2008, the Government launched Operation Rudi Nyumbani (Operation Return 
Home) to facilitate the return of IDPs to pre-displacement areas. In line with this 
development, the Government launched a fundraising effort for over US$460 million to 
meet the full costs of resettlement of IDPs, including reconstruction of basic housing, 
replacement of household effects and rehabilitation of infrastructure, such as community 
utilities and institutions destroyed during the post-election violence. The Government 
also outlined measures to build 32 new police stations in the areas most affected  and 
enlisted the military to reconstruct 22 schools destroyed in Molo and Uasin Gishu 
districts of Rift Valley Province.  
 
PROGRESS IN ENDING THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS 
 
31. This section examines progress made in relation to facilitating durable solutions for IDPs, 
providing humanitarian assistance and protecting IDPs as they return. More specifically, 
it discusses the following: 
a) Resettlement programme 
b) The nature of humanitarian assistance 
c) Measures to promote reconciliation and healing. 
 
Resettlement Programme  
 
32. In January 2008, an estimated 301,000 people moved into 296 camps managed by 
UNHCR and the Kenya Red Cross Society. From May 2008, the Government began a 
resettlement programme with support from humanitarian agencies. Through the 
Resettlement Programme, Operation Rudi Nyumbani, the Ministry of Special 
                                                 
7OCHA Kenya, Humanitarian Update Vol. 6, 2008; see map of camps and regional ‘Hubs’ at 
http://www.depha.org/Unhcr/Maps/KEN_IDP_Situationmap 
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Programmes facilitated the return of 255,094 persons to pre-displacement areas or new 
locations.8 In June, the Government began the disbursement of Ksh10,000 to each 
household for families that were willing to return to their farms. This was called ‘start-up 
funds’ and was meant to support IDPs in buying basic items to restart their lives in return 
areas. The Government also promised to reconstruct 40,000 houses destroyed in the post-
election violence.  
 
33. The number of IDPs and camps has steadily reduced since the start of Operation Rudi 
Nyumbani. Figures on the Resettlement Programme in December showed that only 5,021 
people remained in four camps, including one in Mt Elgon. The tables below illustrate 
this trend. 
 
  Number of IDPs, number of camps:   
 
34. By end of 2008, two other camps were closed in Molo and Naivasha, but there are no 
official statistics on remaining IDPs and camps. The steady decline in official statistics of 
IDPs in camps indicates an apparent success in closing camps. In November, for instance, 
the Government said IDPs remaining in closed camps were only ‘a few hawkers, 
squatters and landless people waiting for land allocation’. 9  
 
35. Even though the number of camps has declined, there are still IDPs in different places. 
This suggests that the problem of IDPs is far from over and that success in addressing the 
issue cannot be tied to the number of IDPs in official camps, or even the number of 
official camps closed down. Furthermore, the actual number of IDPs is yet to be 
obtained. Tentative results from profiling in conjunction with UNHCR and the Kenya 
National Bureau of Statistics in June showed that there were 663,921 post-election 
violence-affected IDPs across the country. This is almost double the estimate that has 
                                                 
8 Interview with Director, Department of Resettlement and Mitigation at the Ministry of Special Programmes, January 
16, 2009.  
9 The Ministry of Special Programmes said no land was available; full Press Statement ‘Daily Nation’, Wednesday Nov 
19, 2008 
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been used for the most part to plan and report on interventions.  
Challenges to the Resettlement Programme  
 
36. The Resettlement Programme has encountered significant challenges, which human 
rights NGOs have consistently raised at various cluster meetings. The Humanitarian 
Forum and the media have also pointed these challenges out.  They include: 
 
37. Proliferation of transit camps: While most official and UNHCR/Kenya Red Cross-
managed camps have been emptied and closed, IDPs have moved into over 160 transit 
site areas because of fear and threats of violence in return areas. Others lack resources to 
reconstruct their destroyed houses while others are waiting for start-up and shelter 
reconstruction funds. They are afraid the money will not be disbursed if they move out of 
the camps. The creation of transit sites means that the fundamental issues underlying 
displacement remain unaddressed. 
 
38. Allegations of use of force and threats: The voluntary nature of IDP movement out of 
camps has reportedly been compromised by the use of force. In May 2008, OCHA 
reported such use of force in Trans Nzoia.10 Human rights organisations such as the 
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights11 and the Kenya Human Rights 
Commission12 also noted the use of force and threats in closing down camps. Our field 
survey findings show that some camps were closed by force. For instance, Kedong Camp 
in Naivasha was forcibly closed and razed in the middle of the night, and some IDPs 
were injured in the process.  
 
39. These findings suggest that not all IDPs moved out of the camps on their own volition. 
The insecurity that was evident in the former residences may have been enough grounds 
for them to refuse to leave the camps when they were required to. The manner in which 
the camps were closed added to an already complex situation. 
 
40. Allegations of embezzlement and corrupt diversion of IDPs Funds: On May 31, 2008, the 
Government began a pilot project to issue Ksh10,000 cash grants to resettling and 
registered IDPs who had returned to their farms in Kipkelion District, where successful 
reconciliation is seen to have occurred. IDPs, the media and human rights NGOs made 
repeated claims of misappropriation evident in missing names, ‘fake’ lists of beneficiaries 
and demands for bribes.13 In September, for instance, the National Humanitarian Fund 
Advisory Board blocked Ksh330 million required to procure building materials in the 
                                                 
10 OCHA Kenya, Humanitarian Update Vol. 20, May 2008, p. 7  
11 Press statement read to the press by the KNCHR Vice Chair, Hassan Omar 
12 Kenya Human Rights Commission, Tale of Force, Lies and Threats: Operation Rudi Nyumbani in Perspective (Nairobi: KHRC, 
2008), see also earlier KHRC Briefing Paper, ‘Operation Rudi Nyumbani Wapi (Return Where?): Formulating Durable 
Solutions to the IDP Situation in Kenya’, June 2008. 
13 South Consulting Survey Reports for Naivasha/Nakuru, Uasin Gishu, Baringo, Nairobi, Nyeri, Kiambu and Molo 
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Rift Valley due to the absence of authentic registers or accountability systems.14 The 
Advisory Board observed that provincial administration and procurement officials had 
drawn up the fictitious lists and claims.  
 
41. IDPs have staged several demonstrations against the alleged corruption15 and claims of 
neglect.16 Generally, there is no oversight or accountability mechanism in place to 
investigate and address the claims and allegations, therefore IDPs might fail to access the 
funds and remain without access to processes of redress. 
 
42. Cash-flow constraints: Reporting to Parliament on Nov 13, 2008, the Special 
Programmes minister said the Ministry had run out of resettlement funds, noting that of 
the Ksh30 billion estimated cost, only Ksh1.96 billion was raised, of which Ksh1.38 
billion has been used to resettle 255,094 IDPs on their land.17 Lack of adequate funds for 
IDPs is indicative of the diminishing significance of the IDPs problem as an issue of 
priority. Our survey found that only 12% think resettlement of IDPs is a Government 
priority compared to job creation (58%), reducing inflation (56%), ensuring food security 
(35%) and education (27%). 
 
43. Perceived ethnic bias: In areas of Kenya, there is a perception that only members of one 
ethnic community were in camps or affected by post-election violence yet some members 
of other groups were displaced or suffered from the post-election violence. The Minority 
Groups International in August observed that while IDPs in camps have received shelter, 
seeds and fertilizers, as well as start-up and shelter reconstruction funds, only a few IDPs 
from less affected communities have received the same assistance.18. In July, OCHA-
Kenya in response to concerns from the field urged humanitarian agencies to observe the 
Do No Harm principle and to practice conflict-sensitive programming.19 Our field survey 
in Molo and Uasin Gishu districts also found that focused assistance to IDPs in camps 
has increased resentment their ethnic community.20 The survey found that these 
sentiments formed from March 2008 with increased exclusive delivery of humanitarian 
assistance to camps, increased security around transit camps, and reconstruction of 
destroyed schools by the military. These activities created a perception of bias in favour 
                                                 
14 The Standard, September 1, 2008, ‘Corruption in Operation Rudi Nyumbani’ 
15 The Standard, Oct 16, 2008, ‘IDPs Outside Camps to Get Help, PC Assures’ 
16 Interview with four IDPs at Parliament Buildings on Nov 13, 2008; see also The Standard, Nov 13, 2008, p.23 
‘Protesting Internally Displaced Persons Camp Outside Parliament for Second Day’; Daily Nation, Nov 12, 2008, p8 
‘Police Teargas Displaced Women’; The Standard, Nov 14, 2008, p 3 ‘Displaced Women Crying for Justice’ 
17 The Standard, Nov 14, 2008, p. 24, ‘State Falls of sh. 30b for IDP Resettlement’ 
18 Minority Rights Group, Kenya Six Months On: A New Beginning or Business as Usual? 
http://www.minorityrights.org/7096/briefing-papers/kenya-six-months-on; our field survey found that Kalenjin 
camps such as Boror, Kipnyigei, Ndugulu, Kipkorosio and Kapilat have not received any assistance, see South 
Consulting, Uasin Gishu Survey Report, unpublished, December 2008 
19 OCHA-Kenya, Humanitarian Update Vol. 24, p. 7; minutes of Humanitarian Forum, June 20, 2008 
20 South Consulting, Uasin Gishu  and Molo Field Survey Reports, unpublished, December 2008 
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of the returnees. Indeed, some observed that “they take everything to the camps and even 
the police are from one community”.21  These perceptions have sustained resentment and 
suspicion, particularly between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin, and have undermined 
reconciliation efforts. 
 
44. IDPs with nowhere to go: Operation Rudi Nyumbani began by targeting land-owning 
displaced persons who were willing to return to their farms. Consequently, other 
livelihood groups and landless people had to wait for assistance sometimes in closed 
camps without humanitarian assistance. Many such IDPs used to rent land or business 
premises, but trading centres had been destroyed and savings exhausted. Some of these 
IDPs have no other ‘ancestral home’ and failure to access Government assistance 
compels them to remain in camps without prospects for durable solutions.22 In addition, 
some property owners have lost access to their homes and livelihoods in urban areas due 
to illegal occupation of their premises.23  
 
45. This implies that while all land-owning IDPs may eventually return to their farms, 
pockets of IDPs will remain, albeit scattered and invisible in urban areas or in 
communities. The search for durable solutions therefore needs to be anchored in 
reconciliation: “… Reconciliation has not been done, security is not the policemen… it is 
me and my neighbour. If he is refusing that I go back, I cannot go back. Others have 
defied the warnings and gone back but came back to the camps.”
24 
 
Seeking Other Durable Solutions   
 
46. Relocation: Individual households and groups of IDPs have moved away from pre-
displacement areas to new locations they consider safe. The movement pattern indicates 
IDPs are unwilling or unable to return. Some access their farms during the day from 
transit camps (where security allows), while many have established other homes in urban 
and ‘ancestral’ districts.25  
 
47. Self-help groups comprising over 10,000 displaced households have relocated to new 
farms in Nyandarua, Nakuru, Naivasha and Nyeri26 in Central Province and the Kikuyu-
dominated South Rift. An unknown number of Luo and Luhya IDPs have also returned to 
Nyanza and Western provinces where they have integrated into their kinship and other 
social support networks. Some of the available statistics are as follows: 
                                                 
21 FGD with Kalenjin IDPs in Uasin Gishu, Dec 2008 
22 OCHA Kenya, A Path to Durable Solutions in Kenya, op cit 
23 Efforts by the Government to repossess the houses through peaceful means or threats of legal action are unsuccessful 
as illegal tenants and neighbours thwart IDPs’ access to their homes or rent dues. 
24 Interview with displaced person in Naivasha, Dec 2008 
25 UNICEF Kenya and Child Welfare Society of Kenya, ‘Separated Children in Kenya,’ Unpublished Research Report, 
August 2008  












Nakuru Ngata 441 Nakuru Nyahururu 2,125 
Nakuru Pipeline 1 600 Nyandarua Mawingo 3,389 
Nakuru Pipeline 2 400 Naivasha Mai Mahiu C 15 
Nakuru Elementaita 39 Naivasha Mai Mahiu B 60 
Eldoret Mai Mahiu 240 Naivasha Mai Mahiu A 150 
  Source: ‘Humanitarian Update Vol 41’, IDP Network, Nov 2008 
 
48. These movement patterns are indicative of unresolved conflicts, likelihood of future 
violence, increased ethnic intolerance, failure of inter-personal and group reconciliation, 
and loss of confidence in the Government to guarantee security. There is a gradual 
balkanisation of parts of the Rift Valley and some urban slums along ethnic lines.27 
 
49. Integration: An unknown number of IDPs have integrated into host communities and 
urban areas. However, there is compassion fatigue in host families and increased 
competition for resources, jobs and social facilities in host areas, leading to xenophobic 
attitudes towards IDPs, such as association with increased crime. These could escalate to 
violence in host areas. The IDPs and host communities adopt symbolic names denoting 
war and devastation (Bosnia, Rwanda, IDP, etc) or new hope and promise of peace or 
abundance (New Canaan, Jerusalem, etc.).  
 
Nature of Humanitarian Assistance 
  
50. In January 2008, humanitarian agencies launched the Emergency Humanitarian Response 
Plan (EHRP) and adopted the Cluster Approach. Over 50 UN agencies, Kenya Red Cross 
Society and NGOs established a coordinated strategy to address priority areas. By April 
2008, humanitarian actors strengthened coordination with the Government, which 
eventually took the lead in some clusters/sectors, including Water and Sanitation, Health 
and Shelter. The following types of assistance have been provided to IDPs: 
 
51. Food: From the outset, the Government, WFP and Kenya Red Cross provided food 
assistance to all IDPs, including those integrated in communities. This obtained up to the 
end of March 2008 when the focus shifted to those in IDP camps. Funding constraints, 
closure of camps beginning May 2008 and relocation of IDPs to dispersed locations, 
however, meant reduced assistance and logistical challenges for humanitarian agencies. 
Some organisations have been providing food aid on an ad hoc basis and IDPs in transit 
                                                 
27 For instance, in Mauche-Mau Narok border in Molo constituency, there is a clear boundary between Kalenjin and 
Kikuyu communities with an artificial ‘no man’s land’. See survey report for Molo, Dec 2008  
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camps have been passed over or not attended to altogether. Food aid by Government is 
not provided in transit camps as focus has shifted to early recovery interventions and 
peace-building. .  
 
52. Shelter:  There are three main shelter initiatives, coordinated through the Shelter Cluster: 
the Government shelter reconstruction project, UNHCR-led shelter cluster initiatives,28 
and the private sector shelter support programme.29 The Government project aims to 
construct 40,000 shelters for IDPs by the end of March 2009 through a Kshs 25,000 
voucher scheme. By October 2008, the Government had disbursed a total of Kshs 
438,900,000 to 7,556 households or 18.89% of the intended beneficiaries.30 However, not 
everyone has constructed shelter using these funds. Some still fear returning to their 
former homes while others have used the money to meet other needs.  
 
53. The UNHCR-led programme seeks to construct 3,000 houses, while the private sector is 
assisting in constructing houses for about 120 households and assisting in building 
schools and Chiefs’ camps. IOM has constructed 700 houses in 12 return areas, and 
NGOs have supported over 1,200 housing units, which have been completed and handed 
to beneficiaries in secure areas such as Kipkelion.31  
 
54. However, the Shelter Project has been fraught with controversy. On the one hand, 
displaced Kalenjin and other non-Kikuyu people claim the project is aimed at benefiting 
the Kikuyu. On the other hand, the Kikuyu claim fears of insecurity make it difficult for 
them to return and reconstruct homes. Still, there are those who argue that the criterion 
for selecting 40,000 households was unclear since more than this number were affected.32 
There are also allegations of corruption, double registration of households and false 
claims. 
 
55. Livelihoods Recovery Support: At the start of Operation Rudi Nyumbani, the 
Government gave seeds, fertiliser and farm tools to returning farmers. In some regions of 
the Rift Valley and Nyanza, IDPs with access to their farms were supported to plough. 
Donors such as ECHO and USAID supported a voucher scheme to IDPs, mostly farmers, 
to purchase seeds, farm tools and implements upon return.33 NGOs such as the Catholic 
Relief Services, Save the Children-UK and Accord also gave support in the form of 
agricultural training and tools.34 However, livelihoods support has been focused on 
farmers. The Food Security and Early Recovery Cluster has been exploring ways of 
supporting non-farmers, and an assessment is scheduled for mid-January 2009. 
                                                 
28 Interview with Director, Department of Resettlement and Mitigation, op cit 
29 UNOCHA Humanitarian Update, Vol. 40, November 2008, p. 7 
30 Interview with Director, Department of Resettlement and Mitigation, op cit 
31 Interview with Director, Department of Resettlement and Mitigation, op cit 
32 UNICEF Kenya Review Mission Report, July 2008 
33 Early Recovery Cluster Meeting, July 16, 2008 
34 Humanitarian Update, Vol. 40, p. 10 
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Others forms of support 
 
56. Psycho-social support: Counselling support for IDPs has been provided by volunteer 
counsellors and religious institutions. UNICEF observed that there is only a small 
number of trained counsellors in Kenya.  
 
57. Legal Aid: The Law Society of Kenya and NGOs such as the Refugee Consortium of 
Kenya, Kituo cha Sheria and Legal Resources Foundation offer pro bono legal services 
on matters related to property claims and access to compensation.  
 
58. Health: Local health facilities have been providing health support but clinics often lack 
essential medicines and some IDPs are afraid to walk through ‘enemy territory’ to access 
the facilities. 
 
59. Education: Displaced pupils were absorbed in host schools or camp schools, which were 
provided with education resources. IDP pupils were not required to wear  school uniform 
or pay levies. In return areas such as Molo, however, some schools are ethnically 
segregated and teachers from ‘outsider’ tribes have been unable to resume duty.35 The 
Kenya Army has completed the reconstruction of 21 out of 22 destroyed schools in Molo 
and Uasin Gishu. 
 
Promoting Healing and Reconciliation  
 
60. The KNDR agreement required the President and Prime Minister as well as other 
political leaders to promote healing and reconciliation by, among other things, holding 
joint rallies, developing a national resettlement programme, deemphasising ethnicity in 
documents, establishing all-inclusive peace and reconciliation committees, and 
appointing a Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission.  
 
61. This section discusses progress made in the following areas:  
a) Peace-building activities. 
b) Level of community participation. 
c) Incidents that stop/disrupt healing and reconciliation. 
d) Progress towards establishment of the TJRC. 





                                                 
35 UNICEF-Kenya, Nakuru  June Monthly Report, 2008; interview with Paula Retaggi, Education Cluster Coordinator, 
October 2008 
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Peace building activities 
 
62. Joint peace rallies: After the signing of the National Accord in March 2008,, President 
Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga visited the Rift Valley and urged 
communities to end violence. However, the visit was clouded by the protocol war 
between the Vice President and Prime Minister. This in itself diminished the importance 
of joint rallies in healing and reconciling communities. Nonetheless, in June 2008, the 
Vice President inaugurated ‘Operation Ujirani Mwema’ (Operation Good 
Neighbourliness) to complement IDP resettlement efforts.  
 
63. In spite of these efforts, inter-communal trust is generally low. The baseline survey 
findings show that 61% cannot trust members of other communities. Only 8% are 
satisfied with the Government’s efforts to promote peace and reconciliation. It is 
worrying that levels of inter-communal trust are low at a time when major reform 
initiatives are planned. Indeed, this low level of trust is an issue of concern and requires 
close monitoring. The announcement of CIPEV recommendations, for instance, was met 
with hostility in the areas affected by post-election violence. Some observed that they 
would re-displace the returning IDPs if the recommendations were implemented or if the 
report showed the politicians from the Rift Valley as perpetrators. On the whole, 
communities are yet to heal and reconcile. 
 
64. Peace training workshops: UNDP and several NGOs have supported a peace training 
programme targeting the youth, volunteers and District Officers on conflict management 
and conflict-sensitive programming.36 Over the past eight months, 396 DOs have been 
trained.37 The Ministry of Education, with support from UNICEF and peace-building 
NGOs, developed a peace-building curriculum for primary schools. However, some 
people are skeptical of the outcome of these initiatives. One respondent, for instance, 
observed, “I don’t know how one can train anyone to make someone else heal from the 
murder of all his family members ….”38  
 
65. Functional District Peace Committees: In June 2008, the Government requested District 
Peace Committees to hold peace rallies in return areas. Peace committees are chaired by 
the District Officer and attended by chiefs, district steering groups, civil society and 
elders. According to the Ministry of Special Programmes, most committees are not 
functional due to lack of funds.39  Some donors will be supporting their activities this 
year but some of the people we spoke to argue that the provincial administration engages 
in peace-building as a routine job and with little enthusiasm. There is limited impact. 
Others argue that political actors would have better impact because they have broader 
                                                 
36 OCHA, Kenya Humanitarian Update Vol. 39 
37 OCHA, Kenya Humanitarian Update, Vol. 40, p. 9 
38 Interview with a District Commissioner in the Rift Valley, Dec 2008 




66. We observed that most peace activities exclude politicians and target only IDPs and 
persons without influence in the community. One respondent observed, ‘What we fear 
most about politicians is their aspect of doublespeak. They will say this in one forum and 
issue a different statement in another. But where they support us you will see a lot of 
enthusiasm. Where they don’t, you’ll see them avoiding the issues.’40 Besides, few 
activities seek to involve the people in mutually beneficial projects.41 There is a need for 
new approaches to peace-building that are sensitive to local perceptions and sensitivities 
and include local political actors. 
 
Incidents that stop/disrupt Healing and reconciliation 
 
67. Political utterances:  In the last quarter of 2008, hostile reactions to the Waki Report and 
the ensuing amnesty debate, intra-ODM divisions and threats over Mau evictions, public 
protests over taxation of MPs and the rising food prices saw some politicians make 
inflammatory statements. For instance, some leaders in the Rift Valley said the evictions 
in the Mau Forest were targeting their community and urged the 15,000 affected families 
to resist it.42  
 
68. Incidents that prevent sustained return of IDPs: A group calling itself Baraget Land 
Defence Force distributed leaflets in Segaitim in Molo warning of an impending raid in 
revenge for attacks on Kalenjins during the post-election violence. The leaflets also 
warned returning IDPs to ‘be prepared’ -- for violence -- if the Waki recommendation to 
take perpetrators of post-election violence to the Hague is implemented.43 In some areas, 
there are local slogans such ‘Zuia Madoadoa’ (Operation prevent the return of ‘stains’) 











                                                 
40Senior official of the provincial administration, Naivasha 
41 Discussions at the Early Recovery Cluster Meeting, Nov 10, 2008 
42 The Standard, ‘You are Out of Step: Ntimama tells Ruto Over Mau  Forest Saga’ 
43 Telephone interview with Kefa Magenyi, National IDP Network Coordinator 




69. From the above, we observe that communities have not reconciled. Even if there is no 
evidence of political violence, mistrust tends to dominate their relations. One respondent 
pointed out that ‘there is calm but not real peace’. At the same time, civil society peace 
efforts are perceived to be cosmetic and ineffective since they do not address the 
fundamental issues. Returnees and so-called indigenous groups have discordant 
perceptions about future co-existence.  
 
70. IDPs are selling off their property or buying land -individually or communally- and 
relocating to perceived safer areas. The formation of transit camps and relocation through 
self-help groups indicate feelings of fear, insecurity and a resolve to be safe ‘next time’. 
Among the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin, there is increased use of enemy imagery and 
speculation about the other’s preparation or preparedness for war, manifest in mutual 
allegations of armament and military training.  
 
71. The closure of camps does not mean the end of displacement; the humanitarian crisis is 
far from over. The emergence of transit camps in return areas means that the underlying 
causes of conflict and displacement have not been adequately addressed. New 
displacement in new areas has compounded the magnitude of the problem. The lack of 
resources and a clear policy and institutional framework hinder efforts to address the 
humanitarian crisis. 
 
72. The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation talks prioritised healing and 
reconciliation and urged the two principals to lead the process. However, initial efforts 
were hindered by protocol wars between the Prime Minister and the Vice President. High 
level political bickering undermines local level reconciliation. Civil society efforts have 
little impact since they do not have a political agenda. In sum, healing and reconciliation 
cannot take place outside far-reaching reforms along the lines outlined in Agenda 4. IDPs 
cannot return or reconciliation be achieved because the fundamental causes of violence 
have not been addressed. The perceived lack of movement on many elements of Agenda 
4 informs the widespread opinion that nothing is being done. Public information on 
progress should be stepped up to help change these perceptions. 
 
73.  Healing and reconciliation requires political leadership; it cannot be left to faith based 
and other civil society organisations at the grassroots. To provide national direction, it is 
critical that the two principals form groups ostensibly to mobilise people at the national 
and grassroots level towards reconciliation. Further, healing and reconciliation is an 
urgent issue that should not await the formation of TJRC or the ethnic integration 
Commission. It should be treated as a national political priority; policies may be required 
to spell out this urgency. The two principals should mobilise the nation towards this end.   
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The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Monitoring Project 
 
Agenda Item 2 
 
         Immediate Measures to Address the Humanitarian Crisis and Promote National Healing and Reconciliation 
 
Report on Status of Implementation 
 
(Matrix on Progress) 
 
Objective  Required 
Actions 










 Legal and 
institutional 
framework 
The National Reconciliation and  
Emergency Social and Economic 
Recovery Strategy elaborated 
 
 
Humanitarian Fund established 
 
 
Department of Mitigation and 
Resettlement  established in the 






Operation Rudi Nyumbani 
launched in May 2008 
The strategy adopted IDP description in Guiding 
Principles but ignored international guidelines on 
establishing a framework for national responsibility  
 
 
The Government raised only Ksh1.96b of the required 
Ksh31.46b budget 
 
The department in the Ministry of Special Programmes 
(MoSP) in the Office of the President is a technical 
department relying on other ministries for staff at 
district and lower level. Attendant challenges include 












hostility and sporadic violence in some return areas of 
the Rift Valley; allegations of use of force and 
corruption in administration of IDPs’ funds.  
 
Resettlement programme focused on IDPs who were 
land owners and in camps to exclusion of integrated 
IDPs and those from several other ethnic communities.  
 
There is need for a National Policy on IDPs based on 
the Great Lakes Protocols 
 
 Reduce IDPs No. of 
camps 
295 out of 296 camps officially 
closed 
There is proliferation of ‘transit’ sites in return areas by 
IDPs who are unable and/or unwilling to return to their 
farms because of insecurity. 
 
Hawkers, squatters, business people, landless IDPs 
without start-up capital or prospect to lease land or 
premises remain in closed camps. 
 
Self-help groups of IDPs have established their own 
camps in safer areas. These camps lack basic services.  
 
There is proliferation of slums or ‘new cities’ exclusive 
to IDPs 
 
Closure of official camps is not an end to displacement 
 
There is need for a strategy on transit camps, since 




 No. of IDPs Registration at camp level by  
Kenya Red Cross or local chief in 
host areas done  
More than half of IDPs did not go to camps. Those 
who did not go to camps included displaced 















Countrywide MoSP Profiling of 
IDPs in conjunction with 
UNHCR and the Kenya National 
Bureau of Statistics – tentative 
results show 663,921,nearly 
double the January estimates 
 
Operation Rudi Nyumbani created fluid IDP situation 
 
Focus only on Post-Election Violence-affected IDPs, 
excluding old caseload IDPs and displacement caused 
by protracted conflict in Mt Elgon, cattle rusting and 
drought/floods has deepened the IDP problem. 
 
 
Lack of common understanding of who is an IDP – 
recognition often contingent on land ownership or 
other arbitrary categorization  
 
There are inconsistencies in statistics on IDPs. 
Agencies have different figures .on IDPs. 
 
Cases of double or multiple registration of households 
inflate the number of IDPs. 
 










Response Plan appeal funded 
71% 
 
Government, UN, Kenya Red 
Cross and NGOs adopted ‘Cluster 
Approach’ to deliver all forms of 
emergency assistance 
 
Lack of coordination among agencies dealing with 
IDPs was a challenge at the height of the crisis 
 
Funding shortfall: many agencies ran out of funds at 
the end of June 2008 and closed office without a clear 
exit strategy, leaving serious assistance gaps. 
 
Logistics: Transit camps are too many, remote and too 
far apart making delivery of aid difficult or impossible 
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Regular cluster meetings to 
enhance identification of gaps 
and reduce duplication  
 
Strengthened coordination 
structures chaired by relevant 
government ministries  
 
Priority: Other emergencies resulting from drought and 
food insecurity, and high food prices have diminished 
the significance of IDPs as a vulnerable group in need 
of special assistance. Attention to IDPs is on decline. 
 
Transition from emergency to early recovery has not 
been easy due to abrupt closure of camps and inability 










 Joint peace 
rallies 
 
After signing the National Accord 
the President and Prime Minister 
made a symbolic tour of the Rift 
Valley and called for  peace 
 
Principals and various groups of 
politicians and government 
officials preached peace at 
various functions  
The important of joint peace rally by the President and 
the Prime Minister was reduced by protocol war 














Secretary on National Cohesion 
appointed by the office of the 
President to work within the 
Ministry of Justice 
 
 
Operation Ujirani Mwema (Good 
Neighbourliness) launched by the 
Vice President  
 
Operation Tujenge Pamoja (Let’s 
Build Together) launched by the 
Secretary resigned four months after appointment 
citing frustration and lack of political will to support 
reconciliation  
 




Perception that the reconstruction of destroyed houses 
and schools is in favour of the returning IDPs has bred 
resentment. Operation Zuia Madoadoa (prevent return 
of the ‘stains’) mooted by ‘indigenous’ communities in 
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developed for primary schools 
Launch of ‘Operation Karibu 
Nyumbani’ in January 2009 led 
by Agriculture Minister William 
Ruto, Rift Valley MPs and the 
provincial Administration  
 
the Rift Valley to prevent government-led pro-IDPs 
‘Operations’. 
 
Ethnically-segregated schools and emergence of 
boundaries and ‘No Man’s Land’ as groups strive to 
stay apart 
 
Although politicians claim to be promoting peace and 
reconciliation, they are said to be mobilising youths for 
violence. 
 




District Peace Committees 
mandated to hold peace rallies 
and meetings in return areas 
 
 
Lack of funds to facilitate peace rallies is challenge 
(some donors will be supporting interventions 
beginning this January 2009 
 
Peace rallies are ineffectual in mediating certain 
conflicts, e.g. illegal tenants in IDPs’ homes, armed 
cattle raiding etc 
 
Low level of community participation in reconciliation 
and healing forums remain an important challenge 
 
Limited legitimacy of peace committees at community 
level – some members are suspected perpetrators or 
associates of politicians who mobilized for violence. 
Peace Committees also are said to have included 
unpopular individuals at the local level 
 
  Civil 
society 
peace and 
Peace and Reconciliation led by 
the early recovery cluster.  
 
 Perception that more is done with returning IDPs than 




on activities  
Support peace meetings between 
communities 
 
Training on peace-building and 
conflict management 
 
Includes early recovery support 
with seeds, farm tools or cash 
vouchers  
 
Development projects benefiting 
all communities in return areas  
Most early recovery interventions reportedly ignored 
the Do No Harm principle by targeting only one 
community 








TJRC Bill drafted and critiqued 
by civil society; revised 
 
Bill passed into law by President  
 
TJRC members are yet to be 
appointed 
There is a growing perception that if recommendations 
of other Commissions (IREC and CIPEV) are not 
implemented, TJRC is a waste of time and money 
 
Civil society is concerned about amnesty clause 
 
There is need for public awareness campaign on the 
TJRC  
 
